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Abstract 
 
The continuity of Indonesian transborder fishing activities into 
Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) highlights the rooted dispute of maritime 
border when contested space of boundary shared by local, state and 
international actor is confronted. Therefore, the prevailing of multilayer 
perspective of maritime boundary should not be easily neglected. The 
colonial project in early 19th century in Southeast Asia that initiated the 
foundation of modern state-formation had challenged the prior-political 
and economic construction of the region, specifically on the issue of 
territoriality. The modernization of shipping and fishing activities of 
which relied on technology and capitals had generated political and 
economic competitions and later persuaded state’s actors of applying the 
strategy of the territorialisation of the sea in order to ensure control. 
Unavoidably, securitization of transborder fishing became preferable 
solution. Transborder fishings are further subjected into state control 
relied on territorial sovereignty.  
This paper examines the transformation of transborder fishing in 
Timor and Arafura Sea to demonstrated the contested space of which 
interplayed by local, state and international actor. State regulations had 
transformed transborder fishing into political space of authority 
competition relied on territorial sovereignty, while socio-cultural 
heritage reminds exploited within fluid space of livelihood survival 
when state function is just absent.  
 
Keywords: Transborder activities; Deteritorialization; Traditional fishing; 
 Arafura Sea. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Baco Muin, a 51 year old Bajonesse living in Bokori village, Kabupaten Konawe, 
Southeast Sulawesi took the risk of transporting migrants to Australian waters in 
order to ensure the educational fund for his children. Being offered the payment of 
Rp 35 million, it was a very lucrative deal against the decreasing price of shark fins 
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fishing. Being detained in Australia prison at Darwin for illegal shark fins fishing in 
Australia Fishing Zone did not stop Jusri, 32 years old Bajonesse living in Mola 
village, Kabupaten Wakatobi, to take the offer of transporting migrants to Australian 
water again, although it turned out to be cancelled after the boats suffered a machine 
breakdown. It is a secure feeling in experiencing Australian’s treatment that 
contributes to his calculation to take the offer. These two cases do not only illustrate 
the transformation of Indonesian transborder fishing in Timor and Arafura Seas, but 
also confirm the complexity on how “boundaries” is such a contested space shared 
and interpreted by locals, states and international actor. State border should not be 
treated in contained physical space, but also social space that has been established 
even before the delimitation of that modern state border. Joel S. Migdal (2004:5-6) 
asserts the prevailing checkpoints and mental maps that attached to boundary. 
This paper examines the transformation of transborder fishing in Timor and 
Arafura Seas to demonstrated the contested space of which interplayed by local, state 
and international actor. State regulations had transformed transborder fishing into 
political space of authority competition relied on territorial sovereignty, while socio-
cultural heritage reminds exploited within fluid space of livelihood survival when 
state function is just absent. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The Transformation of Transborder Fishing in Timor and Afarura Seas  
Transborder fishing, used in this paper, refers to fishing activities that is conducted 
across state border of modern nation-state in the wake of decolonization in the post 
of World War II. While Australia has gained its autonomy of governed from the 
British colonial in 1901, Indonesia just declared its independent as new nation-state 
of which inherited the administration of the Dutch colonial in August 1945. It was 
only in December 1949 that Indonesia gained de jure recognition as new nation-state 
of which Australia was one of the strong supporters, beside India, of its diplomatic 
struggles in United Nations, an international regime of world order in the post of 
World War II. Therefore, transborder fishing mainly refers to fishing activities across 
Australia and Indonesia maritime’s boundary that lies in Arafura and Timor Seas. 
Arafura and Timor Seas geographically situate between the southern part of 
Indonesia and the northern part of Australia. Lying in adjacent to each other as 
illustrated in below map, the seas linked Indonesia archipelago with Australia. 
Timor Sea lies between the southern part of Indonesian province of East Nusa 
Tenggara and two states of Western Australia and Northern Territory, while the 
Arafura Sea position between Indonesia province of Maluku and West Papua and 
state of Northern Territory and Queensland. The Torres Strait links Australia and 
Papua New Guinea frequently used by Australian vessel to approach Arafura Sea. 
Approximately covers the surface area of 610,000 km2 or 240,000 sq mi, Timor Sea 
has number of reefs, strands of uninhabited island and rich hydrocarbon reserves. 
Having its deepest depth of 3,200 m or around 10,500 feet, the part of Timor gap is 
famous known as riches natural resources of oil of which later became the strongest 
political economy magnitude of border conflict in 1970s. The length of Arafura Sea is 
about 1,290 km, while it has 560 km of width. Its depth in average is about 50-80 m 
(165-265 feet) while it increases toward the west. Arafaura sea is known as one of the 
place in Southeast Asia where strong seasonal upwelling1 take place despite in 
Banda Sea (Butcher 2004:12) that influence the food chain system determining fish 
stocks (see map in Figure 1 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Timor and Arafura Sea 
Source: http://easttimorlegal.blogspot.de/2011/01/timor-sea-program-amendment-gets-ok.html 
 
As political decision, maritime boundary between Australia and Indonesia had 
only been imagined, established, negotiated and delimited between two states after 
Australia declared its sovereignty over continental shelf in 1953 and followed by 
Indonesia through Djuanda declaration on 13 December 1957 imposing the concept 
of archipelagic states. In concomitant with the ongoing negotiation to establish new 
international regime on the law of the sea under United Nations Conference since 
1958, Australia and Indonesia entered bilateral negotiation to delimit maritime 
boundary despite of unilateral claimed maritime boundary by each state such as Law 
No.4/1960 on Indonesia waters, the expansion of Australia Fishing Zone (AFZ) from 
3 nm to 12 nm in 1968 and from 12 nm to 200 nm on 1 November 1979 and Indonesia 
Exclusive Economic Zone in 1980. On 9 October 1972, Australia and Indonesia signed 
an agreement of establishing certain seabed boundaries in the area of the Arafura 
and Timor Seas. Confronted with continuous “illegal” transborder fishing activities 
of Indonesia fishermen into AFZ, both countries agreed to compromise of 
recognizing the Indonesian traditional fishing right. Under the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
 
1
Upwelling is one the processed when nutrient (element needs for the growth of phytoplankton a part of 
source of food in marine ecosystem) are brought to the upper level where there is sunlight.  
Republic of Indonesia Regarding the Operations of Indonesian Traditional 
Fishermen in Areas of the Australian Exclusive Fishing Zone and Continental Shelf 
signed in 1974, Indonesian fishermen were allow to keep fishing in limiting area 
within the 12 nm territorial sea adjacent to Ashmore and Cartier Islands, 
Seringapatam Reef, Scott Reef, Browse Island, and Adele Island in subsistence level. 
Later, the regulation was named as MOU Box 1974. It is clear that transborder fishing 
become the keys concept to understand the complexity of problem emerges Timor 
and Arafura Seas. To sum up, the physical map of maritime boundaries between 
Australia and Indonesia imagined and visualized in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2. Maritime Agreements between Australia-Indonesia in the Timor and Arafura Seas. 
Source: Stacey, 1999:341. 
 
Transformation of transborder fishing will be to be examined through four 
aspects relating fishing activities (Butcher 2004: 1-2). First is the object of what and 
how to be caught. It strongly relates to the application of technology of fishing 
vessels and gears. Secondly, it concerns about the volume of the catches. The third is 
the subject who conducting fishing activity. Fourth is the space or location of the 
fishing ground and the time or the prevailing fishing regime in certain fishing 
ground in order to answer where and when fishing activity is taking place. The 
transformation is basically triggered by the expansion of the function of the sea from 
mainly porous of commerce and market network into centre of state security, 
resources extraction, environmental protection and humanitarian responsibility. 
Consequently, the more function attached to the sea, the more set of interests and 
interpretation prevail. 
I argue that it is territorialisation of the sea and the industrial revolution and 
that transform the sea’s function. The colonial project in early 19th century in 
Southeast Asia that initiated the foundation of modern state-formation had 
challenged the prior-political and economic construction of the region, specifically on 
the issue of territoriality. The modernization of shipping and fishing activities of 
which relied on technology and capitals had generated political and economic 
competitions and later persuaded state’s actors of applying the strategy of the 
territorialisation of the sea in order to ensure control. Unavoidably, securitization of 
transborder fishing became preferable solution. Transborder fishings are further 
subjected into state control relied on territorial sovereignty. 
Indonesian fishing activities to AFZ had rooted since 18th century when 
Maccassan voyage had reached Australian coast for trepang collection to satisfied 
Chinese market. Yet, the inception of British political and economic interest in 
Australia had forced the abolishing of Macassan voyage and marginalized the local 
and non-state fishing activities. The expansion of Japanese shipping and fishing 
activities in Indonesian water in 1880s gave further pressure to local fishing activities. 
Forcedly, local and non-state fishing activities occupy a peripheral position against 
state-sponsored fishing activities. Territorialisation of Timor and Arafura Sea both by 
post-colonial state Indonesia and Australia had made transborder fishing activities 
under strong state’s regulation both on the subject of access to fishing ground and 
the use of fishing gears. On one hand, immigration approach unavoidably made 
transborder fishing fall into criminalization if violations are found. On the other 
hand, the existence of market demand for marine products operates beyond the logic 
of geographical space of state’s territorial sovereignty. Historical legacy and 
traditions are often used to justify today “illegal transborder fishing” by the locals. 
In colonial period, fishing activities in Timor and Arafura Sea were gradually 
intervened and regulated by the colonial state and later triggered diplomatic 
confrontation between the Dutch and British Empire. This course of action was 
mainly motivated by two circumstances. First, it is territorialisation of the sea by 
(colonial)-state (Adhuri & Visser 2006: 114-115). The early 19th century marked the 
territorial expansion of the Dutch and the British to consolidate their colonial 
sovereignty by encroaching politic of mapping to subjugate local-indigenous political 
authority into colonial administration and defining state border to solve their conflict 
of competition (Cribb 2000). Fishing gradually was not only subjected to taxation for 
state revenue, but also investment and subsidy for expanding colonial economy. 
Secondly, the introduction of fishing technology was internationally applied and 
spread. The invention of machine boats and modern fishing gear in 18th and 19th 
century had inevitably forced modernization of fishing activity (Butcher 2004). New 
fishing grounds are opened, variety of catches is expanded, volume of catches is 
increased, and more state regulations are applied. 
Fishing activities was later challenged by the expansion of sea exploration as 
well as environmental activitism for sustainable development. The right of coastal 
and archipelagic state to claim and exercise authority within Continental Shelf (CS) 
and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is internationally acknowledged after the 
introduction of Geneva Convention in 1958 and the United Nations of the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. This international regime has further strengthened the 
territorialisation of the sea by state, not only for exploiting the marine resources both 
fishes and minerals, but also for ensuring sustainability of sea ecosystem. Soon, this 
newly state centric regulation prove to create loophole in anarchic nature of world 
system because of the divergence interpretation to the means on how to exercise the 
sovereignty right in opposite to the right to be sovereign on the sea including in 
Timor and Arafura Sea. State interest remains determining on how the act of fishing 
within the CS and EEZ should be regulated. In Timor Sea, Indonesia and Australia 
confront with overlapping claim of EEZ as the length of the area is less 424 nm from 
the outer limit of their territorial sea and the preference of Australia to use the 
principle of prolongation of sea bead under CS than the equidistance of EEZ 
arrangement. This regime has further clustered the sea into state control of territorial 
jurisdiction by delimiting seas based on water column and seabed prolongation, for 
example the newly concept of Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ). Consequently, this 
arrangement of who, what, how and where the act of fishing can be legally 
conducted become sources of transborder fishing conflict. Diplomatic confrontation 
frequently resumes between Indonesia and Australia in early 2000s as the push of 
boat people has complicated the intention of both states to regulate Indonesian 
transborder fishing activity in Australian Fishing Zone. 
 
Expansion of Fishing Ground: 1800s to 1940s 
The network chain of transborder fishing in these seas is determined by the species 
of marine resources to be collected and the prevailing demand of distant market. As 
will be discussed below, transborder fishing more likely falls under industrial type of 
fishing activity than artisanal. It simply means that fishing activity is more motivated 
by export-driven market than to fulfil the need of own-household and domestic 
market demand. The agency of transborder fishing network was actually established 
when the fishing vessel always employed local labour normally as the collector 
species, while the owner of fishing vessel and the end-consumption of the product 
situate far away beyond the fishing grounds. Later, in early 20th century, joint 
ventures of fishing company between foreign and local investor become a customary 
practice in confronting with the need of fishing license imposed by the colonial’s 
state authority. 
The first recorded transborder fishing in Timor and Arafura Sea of which began 
in 17th century is the collection of trepang23 to meet the distant market of Chinese 
cuisine. The expansion of the Makassarre to seek new resource and fishing ground 
partly had been forced by the VOC’s monopoly policy on spice’s trade that destroy 
the role of Makassaree under the Sultanate of Gowa. C.C.MacKnight’s study (1972; 
1976) concludes that Indonesian fishermen mainly from Makassar had been sailed all 
 
2
The term trepang comes from Malays words, teripang. Other might named bêche-de-mer from 
Portuguese word bicho da mar or sea worms. It is also known as sea cucumber or sea slugs. Trepang is 
echinoderm from the class of Holothuroidea that live in sea floor or swallow water that exposed to low tide 
shallow water in mostly Southeast Asia’s sea. One Dutch scientist once had collected names applied for this 
animal and listed about 112 throughout Indonesia (MacKnight 1976:3). Its length is usually around 10 to 50 cm, 
although one might get about 1 m or more. The colour of trepangs would have such variety and depend of the 
species from black, white, grey, brown blue or red. 
  
the way from south Celebes (Sulawesi) for collecting trepang near the coastal 
between Cobourg Peninsula and the Sir Edward Pellew Group from around 1720 to 
1906. The land of these coastal areas was called as Arhnem Land or today Northern 
Territory of Australia. The commonly visited site was Groote Eylanda, while the visit 
to Melville, Bathurst and the Wellesley island was not frequent. It is not coincident 
that Arhnem Land was later part of the first British’s colony established in 26 January 
1788 following Captain James Cook’s first visit in 1770. Trepang industry might have 
invited such interest to open colony settlement after the expedition of Willem 
Janszoon Blaue in 1606 and 1618, the first European recorded journey to Australia 
who had served as governor of the Netherlands East Indies in 1603-1616 including 
act as governor of Fort Henricus in Solor. As navigator, his journey map has 
provided knowledge of navigation to reach Australia continent for European’s 
expansion. 
Calling the activity as the Voyage of Marege (named used by the Makassan to 
call Arnhem Land), MacKnight explains that this fishing activity also invited the 
involvement of local resident, the Aborigine, and later known as the first fishing 
industry in Australia (Worsley, 1955:2 as quoted in Russel, 2004:1). The locals called 
the Makassans as “Manggadjara” or “Munanga”. Throughout the years, trepang 
industry had been developed considerably or in word of MacKnight that the size, 
stability and sophisticated was impressive (1976:1). Matthew Flinders, a British 
navigator who conducted survey of Gulf of Carpentaria and Cape Wilberforce, the 
northeastern of Arhnem Land, discovered six praus or sailing vessel from Macassar 
from South Celebes on 17 February 1803 as part of seasonal voyage collecting for 
trepang (MacKnight, 1976:1). Although people from this voyage are mentioned as 
Malays by Flinders, MacKnight suggest that most of the fishermen were actually 
Makarasse. Yet, the term Maccassan itself, as MacKnight argues, do not exclusively 
refer to racial or ethnicity affiliation because other ethnic such such Buginesse and 
Bajo might also had joined this voyage (1976:1). This trepang industry was later 
expanded in several different part of the Australia costal despite of the Arhnem 
Land. The Makassans had also seen in the Kimberley Coast of Western Australia, 
south of Cape Londonderry of which called by Kayu Jawa by them (MacKnight 
1976:33), and Queensland. MacKnight (1976:29) estimated that there were around 
1000 Makassan’s fishermen doing the fishing in Australian coast in the 19th century. 
The route of this Marege’s voyage to collect trepang from Australian coast in 
colonial period was identified to take at least six path of navigation (MacKnight 1976, 
Fox 1998, Stacey 1999 and Russel 2004) before reaching back the final destination of 
Makassar port to load their catches and later taken to Chinese market. First route 
started from Makassar passing through Banda Sea toward Kei and Aru islands in 
Arafura sea, and finally anchored in Arnhem Land or Groote Eyland. Second route 
was from Makassar sailing through Alor Island and the eastern part of Timor islands 
before heading right direction to Melville islands or Arnhem Land. Third is the same 
route taken with second route, but after reaching the eastern part of Timor Island 
they took left direction to Kimberly coast. The fourth began from Makassar crossing 
Banda sea to the eastern part of Flores island through Flores strait, sailing down to 
Rote strait between Roti and Timor island or mostly anchored in Kupang port before 
continue the voyage to Kimberley coast. Between Kupang and Kimberley Coast, the 
voyage frequently anchored in Ashmore islands or reef to add supplies of water. 
Fifth route was identified taking the same path of fourth route but after anchored in 
Ashmore reef or other nearby island, the voyage would take to left and sailing down 
to reefs of islands in northwest of Kimberly coast. The sixth path would started the 
journey from Makassar to Madura island, passing through the Sape strait between 
the eastern edge of Sumbawa and Komoda island, sailing down to coastal water of 
Sumba Islands passing through Sumba strait to reach Rote island, and later continue 
heading to the Ashmore reef before finally reached the reefs of surrounding islands 
of northwest of Kimberly coast. They took the advantage of wind power of east 
monsoon around the month of August to December. Those routes of voyages that 
took months would usually make a visit in certain land for reloading logistic and 
seeking labour supports (Fox, 1977). For example, the fourth and fifth route would 
anchored in Flores island and Kupang to took labour, while loading food supplies in 
Ashmore reef before heading to Kimberley coast (Stacey 1999). In 1728, VOC’s officer 
in Kupang wrote that he had encountered Bajau people sailed heading to Northern 
Australia for collecting trepang (McKnight, 1976). Even in 1750, VOC’s document 
recorded the issuance of letter to Maccassan fleet arriving in Timor to get passage 
before sailing to Rote island (Fox, 1977).  
Captain Phillip King, for example, also witnessed a fleet of perahu in Timor in 
1927 and was informed that around 200 perahu had sailed annually from Makassar 
to eastern Arnhem Land (1827:135-6 as quoted in Russell, 2004: 6-7). Other study 
suggests the possibility of the presence of people from Timor and Aru in Makassan 
transborder fishing practices (Berndt & Berndt, 1954:40 as quoted in Russell, 2004:8). 
The path of passing through transit points such as islands of Aru, Kei, Madura, 
Flores, Alor, Sumba, Sumbawa, Timor, and Rote played significant function to the 
establishment of network chain to reproduce knowledge about fishing voyage to 
Australian coast. Customarily, it was through oral tradition that information about 
marine resources and navigation was inherited among Indonesian fishermen. In 
following years, Kupang and Pepela in Rote Island became some of the starting of 
port of transborder fishing to Australia Fishing Zone (AFZ) to collect turtles and 
shark fishing. 
In 1906, the Makassar trepang industry collapsed after the Australian 
government officially stopped it after serial of policies in previous years. The official 
reason was the growing threat of disease and alcohol brought by Makassan. Yet, 
some observers believe that the closing of Makassar’s trepang fishing motivated by 
the nationalization of the industry (Berndt & Berndt, 1954: 78 as quoted in Russell 
2004: )including the growing competition with shell-pearling industry that was 
started around 1860s in Kimberley coast. There is written records telling story about 
Captain Francis Cadell, Australian fishing vessel’s owner, who in in 1867 had 
persuaded the South Australia authority to stop Makassan fishing vessel from 
collecting trepang (Mullins, 2001: 9). Captain Cadell was known as one of Australian 
fishing vessel’s owner that involved in shell-pearls industry. Previously, in 1863 
South Australia annexed Northern Territory where most activities of Makassan 
fishing vessel colleting trepang were operated. The discovery of silver and copper in 
South Australia in 1840s and the opening of gold industry in 1851 in Victoria after its 
separation with South Australia colony might contribute to pressure of nationalizing 
the trepang industry. Mac Knight suggests that the actual reason relates to the colony 
authority to protect their coastal area and provided favourable incentives to the 
pastoral development that was more interested to mineral-land industry and shell-
pearls. The growing of diverse industry in Australia had created the need for labour 
supply. Consequently, it invited the state’s authority to regulate industry activities 
including labour. It was labour issues of which later drawn common interest of 
colonies to established a federal state of Commonwealth Australia under the British 
Empire in 1901 and enacted its constitution of governing including Immigration 
Restriction Act 1901 (Schloenhardt, 2003: 55). This political constellation had 
promoted such confident for Australian government to protect their territory against 
foreign activities in the name of national interest. 
As mentioned above, shell-pearl industry was the second fishing industry 
developed in Australia of which involved transborder activities. It was industrial 
revolution in mainland of British Empire that had opened new market of shell-pearls. 
Not only that shell-pearl valued for its pearls for jewellery, but also as rough 
commodity for buttons and other fancy ornament. Buttons industry was developed 
as demand for Victorian’s style fashion widespread among British community of 
which later expand to United States. It was part of Cultural Revolution in 
modernization world. The shell-pearls industry was immediately established and 
become the second of most important transborder fishing industry in Timor and 
Arafura Sea than trepang. In contrast to trepang industry, shell-pearl industry was 
developed in favour of incentives provided by the impact of industrial revolution 
and the opening of Suez Canal. It was initiated by Australia and British capital. The 
industry soon displaced the artisanal type of Aboriginal fishing activity of collecting 
shell-pearl for limited household’s demand into a highly commercialised and export-
orientated industry for distant market on one hand. While on the other hand, it 
stimulated competition to prevailing trepang industry for its overlapping location of 
its fishing grounds. 
Ronald Moore (1994) concludes that Australia shell-pearl was firstly set up in 
Shark Bay (around 540 km from Perth) and North West of Nickol Bay (1000 km from 
Perth) after the expedition of Lieutenant Grey in 1837-1938 to Nickol Bay. This area 
was initially part of New Holland that was established as British colony in 1825, but 
later named as Western Australia in 1832 (in 1829 it was called Swan River Colony). 
Later in 1861, he returned to the Nickol Bay and start to collecting shell-pearl with 
financial support from Royal Geographic Society and British Government. Later in 
1864, flow of pastoralist had flooded into Nickol Bay. An advertisement in 
newspaper on 22 October 1866 about shell-pearl had invited more interest for its high 
return profit. The species collected in Shark Bay was identified as margaritifera 
carcharium of which live densely but limited in swallow water, while in Nickol Bay, it 
was margaritifera maxima lying in deeper water with large amount of supply. The 
margaritifera maxima values more expensive compare to margaritifera carcharium in the 
market’s price. In 1867, it was reported that one vessel named Tays could collected 2 
tons per 4 days and valued about 1000 Pounds. In 1868, there were around 10 vessels 
operating in Nickol Bay collecting shell-pearls. The Aboriginal people were recruited 
to dive reaching deep water in order to satisfy market demand. The highly 
commercial scale of this industry could be seen not only from the application of 
modern fishing vessels and gears, but also the expansion of labour to recruit Asian 
labour mostly Malays and Japanese than only Aborigine. Asian divers were 
acknowledged for their skill and lung capacity for having able to dive below the sea 
depth of 12 metres (Butcher 2004). It was pastoral development that accelerates the 
volume of catches and expand the size of the industry. 
Although concern over stock depletion had daunted the industry in 1870, 
conversely shell-pearl industry grew even more massive. They started to recruit 
Malays divers. In 1875, it was recorded that around 1000 Malays employed in shell-
pearl collection in this area. Yet, received report of bad treatment for the Malays’s 
labour had made the Dutch authority prohibited the further employment of which 
the application decreased the number of Malays working in this shell pearl. In 1887, 
more Japanese divers were recruited along with the introduction of diving dress and 
the pressure of more regulated condition for Malays labour proposed by the Dutch 
authority. It was Augutus Siebe who invented the technology in England in 1839 
(Butcher 2004:125). The diving gear consist of diving dress made of waterproof 
canvas, a helmet, a corselet, weighted shoes, a hand pump, a rubber hose and a 
lifeline. (Butcher 2004: 125). A rubber hose was connected to hand pump to deliver 
the air to the helmet, while the hand pump was placed and operated on board. The 
diver was tugged by a rope function as lifeline. Although the shell-pearls industry in 
Nickol Bay had still operated, new fishing ground was already opened in Broome in 
1880s. In Broome, new fishing technology was firstly introduced using floating 
station and apparatus method (diving dress and mechanical pump of compressor) in 
order to extend time of diving for more collection in deep water. Later, other new 
fishing ground opened in Queensland especially around the Torres Strait when 
Australian shell-pearl industry new technology of diving gear. At this point, shell-
pearling fishing had expanded their fishing ground from swallow into more depth 
water and move further distant from the coastal area. Due to attractive economic 
values of the industry, the colony authority of Western Australia and Queensland 
applied high taxation to the industry in 1889. In 1914, there were 1115 Japanese, 585 
Malays and 247 Koepangers who worked at shell-pearl industry in Western Australia 
(Martinez 2009: 98) Ronald Moore (1994) and Steve Mullins (2001) believed that the 
issuance of high taxation to shell-pearling had further forced Australian vessel of 
shell-pearls collection to seek new fishing ground in addition the threat of depletion 
on available known fishing ground in Australia. In addition, the publication of 
British naturalist, Alfred Russell Wallace’s expedition to the Malays’s archipelago 
between 1854-1862 also promoted a wide spreading knowledge about the abundance 
natural resource along this strands of island including shell-pearls in Aru and Kei 
island. In the word of Wallace 
  
The bottom was absolutely hidden by a continuous series of corals, sponges, actiniae, and 
other marine production, of magnificent dimensions, varied forms and brilliant colours. 
The depth varied from about twenty to fifty feet, and the bottom was very uneven, rocks, 
and chasms, and little hills and valleys, offering a variety of stations for the growth of 
these animal forests. In and out among them moved numbers of blue and red and yellow 
fishers, spotted and banded and striped in the most striking manner, while great orange 
or rosy transparent floated along near the surface (Wallace 1890: 226) 
 
Year later in early 1880, several attempts of Australia expedition had been 
conducted sailing to Aru island for example the story of fishing vessel Jessie (1872) 
and Franz (1872). In between 1880-1881, Clara Crawford, another Australia fishing 
vessel was forced out the left Aru island. As a counter response, the Dutch built a 
post in Aru island. Previously, in 1828, the Dutch also had built Fort du Triton and 
declared Makassar, Ambon, Bandanera and Ternate as free port. In 1878, it was 
reported that five Australian fishing vessel namely Onward, Good Luck, Ajelia and 
Caft had been forcedly anchored for three year doing other possible activities in 
Makassar after denied of collecting shell-pearl before paying tax to the Dutch. 
Another Australian fishing vessel under the command of Captain Cadell was ended 
by him getting killed by his own crew in their attempts of harvesting shell-pearl in 
Kei Island in 1879. The operation of Australian fishing vessel in Arafura Sea heading 
to Aru Island invited strong response from the Dutch government. One of the 
reasons was believed to be related to information of the bad employment condition 
of Indonesian recruited by the Australian fishing vessel. It was only in 1886 that 
Australian fishing boats had anchored in Aru Island in their way back from 
Kimberly area to Torres Strait after their collection of shell-pearl there were still not 
satisfied their target of beneficial return. Since then, there was a discussion in Dutch 
government whether orang kaya in Aru (a kind of rich and community leader) could 
legally transfer their communal rights of fishing to foreigner, respectfully to 
Australian fishing vessel.  
In 1891, the Dutch concern over Australian shell-pearl fishing vessel came into 
tested. Steve Mullins (2001) had comprehensively described episode of the Dutch 
and British rivalry over access to shell-pearl fishing ground. Confronting to high tax 
of shell pearl issued by Western Australia and Queensland under the extra-territorial 
Act of 1889 and the amendment of 1875 Kindnapping Act that prohibited employing 
Pacific islander on oneh hand, while on the other hand shell-pearls and pearling 
industry in England grew more lucrative, a London jewellery entrepreneur, Edward 
Streeter decided to involved into this fishing industry. His Pearling & Trading 
Company, Ltd. legally registered in British set up a fleet of Sree Pas-Sair consists of 
Mavis and Flowerdale fishing vessel that soon would despatched to Aru island. They 
employed around 61 Solorre divers recruiting in Kupang. Possessing an elite circle, 
the company’s chair of board director, T.H. Haynes lobbied the British’s Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Salisburg in 1891 by writing him about his company intention to sail 
to Aru island for collecting shell-pearl and saying about the presence of Dutch vessel 
of which probably operated beyond 3 nm as and to be considered against customary 
law of High Seas. His action might be strongly motivated by the incident of Costa 
Rica Packet vessel that was wrongly arrested in Ternate and put into detention in 
Makassar.  
He requested for compensation of protection and cessation from any 
interference. Yet, Lord Salisburg replied in 28 July 1891 by saying any future stage of 
affairs should be addressed in the court since the British, in position, to develop 
friendly colonial relations with the Dutch after border conflict in Bornea 
(Kalimantan) that came into the signing of the 1891 border agreement. This replied 
turned to dissatisfy T.H. Haynes by saying neutral position in the situation of 
possible future conflict would be perceived as invasion to British’s right in the High 
Seas. This kind of physiological warfare on the activities of Australian shell-pearling 
fishing vessel, to Steve Mullins (2001), created by the perceived image about each 
other. The Dutch inclined to be in hostile relations as they had seen Australian of 
being abusive to Malays labour and lawlessness, while Australian had always seen 
the Dutch authority of being Decay Empire with jealousy and unfairly hoarded 
resources. The predicted course of conflict actually came to happen. In March 1893, 
the Dutch resident of Ambon, Baron van Hoevel in Aru, received complaint from 
Rajah Oejir in Dobo about the work of Mavis. At the time of receiving complaint, the 
Dutch warship Java was anchored in Dobo.  
Responding to the complaint, Hoevel invited Mackellar, the vessel’s officer, to 
discuss the matter in the presence of Raja of Oedjir as well. Mackellar explained that 
the current activities was his second attempt of collection shell-pearl after previously 
Raja of Oedjir himself had granted him permission in return of receiving payment. 
He argued that it should not be a problem after the prevailing agreement. 
Considering his explanation, Hoevel suggested Mackellar to give another payment 
for his second course of action of which he agreed. But, Rajah had different 
proposition to completely stop the activity by saying his concern about 
environmental impacts. The meeting was assumed to reach the agreement of 
stopping any kind of future fishing activities. On 12 May 1893, O’Kelly, friend of 
MacKellar sent cable to Hayes about the incident and saying he would keep 
continuing the fishing activity. Receiving the cable, Hayes wrote again to Lord 
Salisburg about the act of harassment and required British’s protection. The Foreign 
Office responded by saying that such action could only be done when evident of the 
harassment was received. Hoevel found that Mavis still kept operating the collection 
of shell-pearls when later he visited Dobo. This time, it was reported that the 
payment was made to orang kaya, not the Rajah. Quickly responding to the situation, 
Hoevel summoned O’Kelly, but this time directly to the Java’s warship with the 
presence of Dobo postholder. O’Kelly claimed that he had paid for the collection in 
return for permission that had been granted by orang kaya. He testified that Dobo 
postholder himself who suggest him of asking permission from orang kaya instead 
of Raja. Further, Mackellar claimed that he had also made payment to Dobo 
postholder himself for 2 pounds per ton of collected shell-pearl. Highly disturbed by 
the way Mackellar explained the situation both of his temper and abusive way of 
behaviour and the accusation of bribery made to his subordinate, Hoevel decided to 
dismiss the meeting. 
Following up the situation, Hoevel sent report to Dutch authority in Batavia 
that Australia had been showing such complete contempt for the Dutch Authority 
(Mullis 2001:15). He described the situation that both O’Kelly and Mackellar had 
intimidated the Postholder; instilled fear into the pro-Dutch population; insulted the 
Dutch government, and had created the orang kaya by taking more shell-pearl than 
the actual price they had paid. He also wrote that around 500 Australia boats were 
expected to arrive from Australia. In turn, Batavia authority had responded the 
report seriously by instructing the Commander of the Netherlands Indies Navy, Vice 
Admiral Roell to immediately dispatched Sumatra, Navy Fleet equipped by torpedo 
trial off Madura. Another two warships, Trompe and Pontianak, had also been 
dispatched. Examining the situation, Vice admiral Roell suggested that the only 
possible course of action was escorting the lugger skipper backed to the mother 
vessels. To completely forced them out the area including the mother vessel that 
stationed beyond the 3nm of Dutch water would impossible, unless a new law would 
be passed outlawing the act of fishing within the 3nm of Dutch water. Roell 
acknowledged the customary law of 3nm and the High Sea.  
What actually happened on the incident was unclear. The Northern Territory 
Times wrote the testimony of Captain Lumsden, from Flowerdale, that they had 
managed to kept situation in order and returned with shell-pearl worth around 3000 
Pounds. While the Soer, a newspaper in Batavia, referred Australian as freebooter 
who doing act of robbery. Although in the fisrt place, Hovel intended to pursue the 
rights of Aruese over shell-pearl outside the 3nm of Dutch water as time 
immemorial, but the Dutch authority in Batavia opted not to have that position. One 
of the reasons relates to the 1886 colonial regulation stating that people of Aruese 
possessed no legal right over shell-pearl beds on the sea water. In addition, The 
Hague also expected to build a friendly relation with the London. On the follow up 
of diplomatic communication, both Baron Hoevell and T.C.Hayes admitted that the 
course of action took place within the 3 nm of Dutch water. Hayes also added that 
the shell-pearl collection had only been executed after permission was granted. The 
state of affair ended by The Dutch authority issued an ordinance No.261/1893 legally 
claimed the Dutch territorial water of 3nm on 5 October 1893. 
After this course of diplomatic tension between the Dutch and British, the shell-
pearls industry gradually transformed into new arrangement of transborder fishing 
activities. The operation of Celebes Trading Co. began in 1905 interestingly 
deciphered this transformation taken from the relationalist point of view. Established 
in 1905 by James Clark, an Australian entrepreneur, Celebes Trading Co. started the 
successfully path in fishing industry by incorporating the core concept of transborder 
fishing activities in term of subject. James Clark had his ownership share at the 
Pearling and Trading Trading Co. There were a meeting in London with the presence 
of Edward Street, E.H. Haynes, and A.L.Coventry (Clark’s manager) before the 
established of the new company. Later, James Clark expanded his fishing industry by 
introducing shared ownership through license and capital share. By registering his 
company in Batavia, James Clark was able to obtain concession of exclusive right 
harvesting shell-pearl in Aru’s fishing ground from the Netherlands East Indies 
authority. The initial asset of the company was equipped by 7 schooner fleets 
consisting of around 115 vessels. Later in 1907, the capital ownership was expanded 
when his bother A.J. John and local Indonesian, Said bin Abdullah Baadila from 
Banda joined the industry by operating there more fleets and made the company 
now possessed 135 vessels collecting shell-pearl in water of northern Arafura sea. 
The Baadilla family, some Arabs living on Banda Island actually had formed some 
kind of small company or firm that received concession from the Dutch authority to 
collect pearl-shell (Butcher 2004: 129). The company also opened a branch office in 
Dobo, Aru’s port, employed around 700-1500 local people and operated until 1916 
when this capital consortium finally collapsed. Later, the company established new 
smaller capital ownership and worked until Pacific War that had forced the company 
to stop their fishing operation. 
The strong gesture of the Dutch colonial to administer and control the fishing 
activities within their self-view of territorial water had further strengthened by the 
following serial of ordinance after the one in 1893. After confrontation with the 
British, the Dutch authority conducted survey that brought facts about the prevailing 
practice of local authority such as Sultan of Tidore and Ternate, and the Raja in east 
cost of Sumatra (around Riau islands) to possess and exercise exclusive rights to 
collect pearl-shell, pearl, trepangs and other marine resources. As a response to 
exercise central authority and impose monopoly, Batavia denied self-governance 
practice of having own sea territorial in 1902, and issued ordinance no.822/1919 
stated that only central government who own the authority and right of regulating 
sea territorial. Relying on speed and volume, the operation of Japanese fishing vessel 
that was perceived within the Netherlands East Indies water had triggered a quite 
wide spread complaint from local fishers. They caught sea bream, scads, tuna, and 
even sharks by developing mobility to several fishing technique from muro ami, 
trawling, pursue seining, pole and line and longline fishing. This practice had 
accumulated pressure to regulating transborder fishing activities mostly refer to the 
conduct of fishing by non-Dutch subject. As further state’s response, Batavia issued 
another ordinance (No.127/1927) that declared territorial water of the Netherland 
East Indies was included water within 3 nm of rocks, reefs, and banks. Further 
authority on the sea was claimed by the Dutch through the endorsement of the 
Territorial Sea and Maritime Districts Ordinance no.497/1935. This ordinance 
introduced a new concept of territorial sea of which is defined as the band of waters 
around each island and extending out from lines across the entrances to bays and 
estuaries. The concept referred to both idea of territorial sea and internal waters. In 
the outbreak of World War II, Batavia again revised the concept and enacted 
Territorial Sea and Maritime Districts Ordinance No.422/1939 of which defined 
territorial sea to be measured from the low tide line of each individual islands into 3 
nm length. 
This shell pearl industry gradually collapsed following the World Word II 
when new invention of plastic had provided cheap substitution for buttons industry 
(Butcher 2004:135). Japanese soon started to develop a new pearling industry by 
adopting technology of genetic engineering to grow cultured-pearls, so that they 
could reduced the cost of finding traditional pearl-shell deep under the sea water 
and sustain the volume of the production to prevent depletion and environmental 
harassment. It was actually a British naturalist of Marine biology, William Saville-
Ken who firstly invented the technology of breeding cultured-pearls. His working 
experience as commissioner of fishery in several state of Australia from Tasmania, 
Queensland and Western Australia from around 1884 to 1895 had brought his 
interest to pearling as depletion of shell-pearl became the major issue of Australian 
pearling industry at that time. Yet, it was Tokishi Nishikawa who later made the 
patent rights of the technique of cultured pearl after learned from Saville-Ken and 
applied the technique to develop cultured-pearling industry in Japan. The collapse of 
trepang and shell-pearls industry was later replaced by other marine commodity 
such as tuna (skipjack and yellowfin), sharks (initially as by catch product of tuna 
fishing), and scads in Timor and Arafura Sea to meet the opening of new fishing 
market. 
 
 
Securitization of transborder fishing: Post-colonial Indonesia to UNCLOS 
The outbreak of Second World War and Japanese military invasion to Southeast Asia 
had temporarily destroyed the fishing industry in this area between the years of 1942 
to 1945. Many of fishing vessels had been destroyed, the primary of western market 
was collapsed and the safety of navigation around Southeast Asia water had strongly 
been under Japanese surveillance. Economic activities including fishing had been 
discouraged and centralized to supply military logistic of Japanese in Pacific War. As 
the war finally ended in 1945, economic recovery become the key issue in the post-
war rehabilitation and reconstruction including fishery and the expansion of sea 
exploration. It was the United States through the Truman Declaration who firstly 
declared the expansion of territorialisation of sea by claiming the sovereignty rights 
along the prolongation of continental self-seabed on 28 September 1945. Later, the 
issue had brought states to convene discussing the establishment of the law of the sea 
in serial of multilateral negotiations in 1958, 1960, 1973 and 1982 under the 
framework of United Nations system that known as the United Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. Daunted with the fear of future devastated war, international regime 
to deter aggressive action of state was established through establishment of United 
Nations (UN). Relied on respecting state’s sovereignty, soon UN became an 
influential international arena to (de)construct new world order. This international 
gesture had deepened the territorialisation of the sea under state control.  
It was not surprising that later territorialisation of the sea developed into part of 
national identity as delimiting border in the sea for coastal state become the source of 
territorial sovereignty. Actually, transborder fishing industry in Indonesian water 
had already resumed in 1947 when the small Japanese pole-and line fishing vessel 
was re-established by the Dutch soon after end of the war. Based at Aertembaga, 
North Sulawesi, several fishing vessels started to caught skipjack tuna near the water 
for domestic market. In 1950, this company was nationalized by Indonesia authority 
soon after the signing of Round Table Negotiation in 27 December 1949 when the 
Dutch recognized Indonesia independent. In 1951, Indonesia also built longliner 
fishing company to catch tuna at Indian Ocean. Later in 1961, Indonesia built another 
new pole and line fishing company in Ambon. In 1962, another longliner vessel had 
expanded into water near Christmas Island catching tunas. 
Christmas Island had been under Australia’s possession after being transferred 
from Singapore’s possession in October 1957 by British colonial. The British itself 
annexed the island on 6 June 1888. However, massive scale transborder fishing 
industry just took place when Japanese fishing company started their longlining 
operation soon after the lifted of MacArthur Line in 1952.3 Motivated by post-war 
economic recovery and growing domestic market demand, Japanese fishing industry 
found rich fishing grounds of which included Indian Ocean in the south of Java 
(Butcher 2004:215). It is important to underline that Japanese fishing industry was 
 
3MacArthur Line refer the decree issued by MacArthur the Supreme Commander of Allied 
Forces in 22 June 1946 to limit the area of which Japan could conduct fishing and whaling activities as 
the repercussion of War sanction.  
  
strongly supported by government incentives including subsidy since 1898 under 
Meiji Japan regime. There were ten longliners and Kaiko Maru mothership began 
their fishing activities in seas of Celebes, Banda and Moluccas including Sea and 
Arafura Timor in 1952. While later in 1954, the mothership of Saipan Maru operated 
in south of Java and equipped with five longliners boats. The revival of Japanese 
fishing industry in the post-war demonstrates the transformation of transborder 
fishing practice with more sophisticated system involving mothership which carried 
smaller boats on its deck of which then later despatched into the water when fishing 
grounds were found. They would either be towed nor lifted back on deck when 
started moving to another designated fishing ground (Butcher, 2004:215). 
 
The Japanese mothership’s operation is best illustrated below. 
The mother ship receives the catches of the fleet on the fishing ground, supplies them 
with fuel, oil, water, store, bait and ice and keeps in daily radio contact receiving 
details from them of daily catch, fishing condition, and oceanographical and 
meteorogical information. The director of the operations advises the catchers of the 
most suitable fishing areas and arranges the time for each catcher to transfer its catch 
to the mother ship. He may also direct several of the catcher boats to reach for better 
fishing area (Beare, et.all 163:14 as quoted at Butcher 2004: 216) 
 
They caught tunas from yellow fin, albacore to southern blue fin along 
Southeast Asia water in adjacent to Indian oceans. In Timor and Arafura seas, they 
fished yellow fin tuna. Later in 1957, the operation was confronted by Indonesian 
declaration to expand the territorial sovereignty based on the concept of archipelagic 
state of which include Timor and Arafura Sea as internal water.  
On 13 December 1957, Indonesia proposed the concept of archipelagic states 
under the Djuanda Declaration. Indonesia basically would close its internal water 
mainly straits and seas between islands stretching from Karimata strait in the west to 
Arafura Sea in the east for the passing of foreign vessels without notification. The 
concept derives from the point of view that strands of Indonesian archipelagos must 
be seen as a unity of territory. By proposing the baseline technique, Indonesia would 
delimit their territorial water by drawing baseline that connected the low-tide points 
of its front islands; so that internal water inside the baseline referred as the 
archipelagic water. In return of concession, Indonesia would regulate the act of 
innocent passage to guarantee the security of united Indonesia archipelago. This 
declaration was initially motivated to stop the passing of the Dutch warship in Java 
Sea following the escalation over Papua’s campaign with the Dutch.4 Although the 
concept of archipelagic state was soon strongly rejected by many states, yet the 
concept was later internationally recognized as new law of the sea after almost 25 
years of negotiation process under the auspices of UN’s system.  
Actually in 1961, Philippines followed Indonesia stance of claiming themselves 
as the archipelagic states as well. Japan quickly condemned Indonesia unilateral 
 
4Interview with Havas Arif Oegroseno, Indonesian Ambassador to the Belgium and 
Luxemborg, 19 March 2103 in Belgium. 
  
declaration as violating its traditional fishing right and brought first fishery conflict 
in post-colonial Indonesia regarding transborder fishing. Indonesia started to detain 
Japanese fishing vessel that led to serial negotiation. Initially, Japan held the position 
not the recognize the declaration, when they showed lack of interest to engage with 
Indonesia’s proposal for setting up a joint venture company for tuna’s fishing. In 
their view, signing to an agreement with Indonesia would be seen as a gesture to 
recognize Indonesia’s declaration (Butcher 2004:220). Yet, after series of 
simultaneous bilateral negotiation, Indonesia and Japan reached compromise that 
led to the signing of Banda Sea Agreement in 1968. The gradual shifting of Japan’s 
position most probably was influenced by the going intensive negotiation under the 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea since 1958. The inclination of most 
state to acknowledge the right of a state to claim continental shelf-seabed under 
UNCLOS I in 1958 and the ongoing discussion to further regulate claim over 
territorial sea including fishery right might been assessed by Japan as a shifting 
international attitude to regulate the sea. The agreement allowing Japan longliners 
vessel to catch Tuna in designated area of most of Banda Sea, yet excluded the water 
within 30 miles of Ambon. In return, Japan had to pay amount of fee to Indonesia 
authority. For Indonesia, the signing of agreement was taken as “de facto” 
recognition to Djuanda declaration, while for Japan, it was only treated as retribution 
fee of obligation to report the volume of their catch after entering Indonesian port 
(Butcher 2004:220). Acting on behalf of Japan’s representative, the National 
Federations of Fisheries Cooperative of Japan and the Federation of Japanese Tuna 
Cooperative Associations signed the agreement instead of the Japan Government 
itself. This gesture signalled the reluctant of Japan Government to officially accept 
the implying recognition to Djuanda declaration. This agreement would later renew 
every years until 1975 after Indonesia became unsatisfied of which one of the aspect 
is the changing of Japanese fishing practice. Under the pressure of increasing labour 
cost and fuel price, Japanese longliner began to catch bigeye tuna instead of previous 
yellow fin tuna and directly sent fresh catch to Japan’s sashimi market with quickly 
refrigerated system (Butcher 2004: 222). By mid of 1960s, other longliner vessels from 
Taiwan and Korean also began to join the tuna fishing industry in Indian Ocean. 
Following the Japanese and Indonesia fishery conflict and the (re-)making of 
the law of the sea under UN system, fishing activities within Indonesia water became 
more intensive and the volume of catch sharply increased between 1970s into early 
1980s. Under the New Order regime, Indonesia pursued more aggressive policy on 
fishery to boost their economic growth. Several national fishing companies for 
longliner fishing was established mostly in joint venture arrangement with Japanese 
company as a strategy to overcome problem of capital and technology. PT. Perikanan 
Samudra (PSB) was established to work with Japanesse longliner company under the 
Banda Sea Agreement. Later, PT. East Indonesia was established with loans received 
from World Bank and Asian Development Bank and cooperation scheme with 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Japan Government and entered 
a joint venture agreement with Japan’s longliners, Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha that owned 
80% of capital share. As early in 1970s, fishing activities in Indonesia water began to 
use trawl and purse seine to increase the catches. There are at least three driven 
factor that contribute to massive transborder fishing activities in Indonesia waters. 
First is the steep demand for fishes to meet the population growth. If in 1850s, when 
modern fishing industry began in the Netherlands Indies, population in Java as the 
most dense areas was around 9,5 million people, but in early 1970s, Indonesia 
population had reached 130 million people. To compare with bigger scenes, in 1850s 
population in Southeast Asia state comprised around 40 million and in 1995 the 
number had reached 480 million people. Second is the export oriented policy of 
Indonesia’s New Order regime to increase the amount of export commodity. Marine 
product became one of the priorities after Indonesia actively adopted the concept of 
archipelagic states. Thirdly is the competitive nature of fishing industry after the 
introduction of the CS regime and ongoing negotiation of fishing right under the 
EEZ regime. Although the second UN conference on 1973 failed to reach agreement 
regarding the limit of territorial sovereignty and fishing zone, in contrary soon after 
the conference most Southeast Asia and Pacific states had declared their EEZ. Burma, 
now Myanmar became the first declared its EEZ in April 1977, followed by Vietnam 
in May 1977, Cambodia and Philippines in 1978, Australian in 1979, Indonesia in 
1981 and Malaysia in 1984. Inevitably, states inclined to be aggressive to exploit their 
marine natural resources. Thailand would be the first case suffering from this EEZ 
claim when their fishing catch sharply fell down in early 1980s. As consequence, Thai 
fishing vessels started to intrude into water of neighbouring states from Burma, 
Malaysia to Indonesia of which later classified as illegal fishing. Ironically, as the 
biological production circle would predict as the case of trepangs and shell-pearl, 
stock depletion gradually threatened the industry just in early 1980s. 
In contrast to state-sponsored transborder fishing company of which operating 
in modern equipment, capital ownership and massive scale of catches, “traditional” 
Indonesian fishermen were marginalized from this modern-commercial fishing 
industry. On one hand, the joint venture fishing industry failed to provide adequate 
labour market that is able to absorb and integrate local fishermen. Technology had 
overcome problem of finding fishing grounds and securing safety navigation on the 
sea of which previously depend on the skill and expertise of local fishers. Most local 
fishermen were forced to occupy peripheral-small market demand either household 
consumption or domestic market. On the other hand, the expansion of Australia 
Fishing Zone (AFZ) had further limited fishing ground of Indonesian fishermen. 
Although MOU Box 1974 could be seen as international legal base to recognized 
Indonesian fishing tradition, yet the implementation proved to be problematic since 
the multi-interpretation prevail as the expansion of sea’s function emerged. Below is 
the physical map of the MOU box 1974 that regulate fishing activity of Indonesian 
fishers (see detail on Figure 2). 
In the late of 1970s and earlier 1980s, there were events that forced both 
Indonesia and Australia to further regulate activities in Timor and and Arafura Sea. 
First is the wave of refugee coming from prone-conflict countries such Vietnam, Sri 
Lanka, Iran and Afghanistan seeking for protection or even asylum seekers. The fall 
of Saigon following war in Indochina had ended Vietnam War in 1975. Soon in 1978, 
a second wave of Vietnam refugee flooded into neighbouring state including 
Indonesia. Referred as boat people, the floating boat people caused a humanitarian 
crisis. Indonesia provided Galang islands for Vietnam refugees. Despite United 
States and Canada, Australia also become friendly destination to refugees and 
asylum seeker and began to welcome Vietnam refugees. Later in 1980s and 1990s, 
influx of refugee seeking asylum in Australia continue as conflict broke in Sri Lanka, 
Afghanistan (Schetter, 2012:5) and Iran. They mostly used sea by boats to reach 
Australia while use Indonesia as the transit point. The image of Australia as “heaven 
destination” for immigrant inevitably flourished and established into a continuous 
“traditional route” of keep attracting immigrant. Since then, immigrant issues highly 
politicize into campaign agenda to win Australian domestic election (Phillips & 
Spink, 2011:5). Public opinion in Australia shared the perception of threat coming 
from immigrants into Australian society as well as the conduct of human 
trafficking/smuggling of which received assistance from Indonesia fishers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Transborder Map of MoU BOX 1974 
Source : Fox & Sen, 2002:9. 
 
Second is Indonesia’s military annexation to East Timor in 1975-1976, later 
know as independent Timor Leste in 1999. The annexation was claimed to prevent 
communism spreading after flower revolution broke up in home colonial state, 
Portugal. Motivated to establish a good neighbourhood relations, Indonesia and 
Australia entered serial of negotiation to delimit boundary on the sea. 
Indonesia sought Australia’s recognition to the inclusion of East Timor within 
its territorial sovereignty, while Australia sought opportunity to revive negotiation 
regarding oil reservation in Timor gap that had been ignored by Portugal (Djelantik, 
2003). Between the years of 1962 – 1970, two consortium conducted serial 
geophysical survey in Timor sea & Bonaparte Gulf that concluded the area to be 
petroliferous for oil and gas reserves (King, 2002:1-2). The first consortium consists of 
Arco Australia Ltd, Australia Aquitaine Pty.Ltd & Esso Australian Ltd, while the 
second was established by Woodside Petroleum, Burma Oil Company, and Anglo-
Dutch Shell Oil Company. 
Third is the depletion of marine stocks which push growing awareness to 
marine protection. On one hand, fishing into Australian water kept attracting 
Indonesian fishers as a respond to marine depletion in Indonesia water and 
continuous lucrative market. But, on the other hand, Australia declared Ashmore 
reef as Australian Natural Reserves on 16 August 1983 under National Park and 
Wildlife Conservation Act 1975 and become the subject of environmental protection. 
Initially, Ashmore reef was only annexed by the British in 1878. On 23 July 1931, 
Ashmore reef together with Cartier Island was transferred to Australia’s possession 
of which later fell under the authority of Northern Territory. Trepang, trochus, 
turtles, sharks, seabirds are some of animal under protection and prohibit to be 
caught in this reef. Since then, illegal trespassing within AFZ and activities in 
Ashmore reef become highly scrutinize and boat burning became of the measure 
undertook by Australian Marine Patrol to deter future illegal practices. Even 
scholarly work by James Fox and Anthony Reid in 1992 had used the concept of 
illegal entry to categorize Indonesian fishermen detained in Australia prison for 
fishing in AFZ. In sum, these events had expanded activities in Timor Sea and 
Arafura Sea from initially fishing to passageway of immigrants, mineral exploration 
and exploitation, and environmental protection. The expanded function of Timor 
and Arafura Seas inevitability had made activities in the area subjected to further 
state regulations. Security measures are preferably employed to uphold law 
enforcement and defend territorial sovereignty of the state. 
The resumption of diplomatic tension between Indonesia and Australia 
remains happening. In 2001, the Tampa incident retested bilateral relation of 
Indonesia-Australia. Indonesia’s ferry carried around 433 people from Afghan and 
Sri Lanka seeking for asylum sank near Christmas Island. A Norwegian cargo ship, 
Tampa came to rescue and sailing to approach Chrismas Island. Yet, Australia 
authority denied authorization to anchor, while the ship’s captain refused to turn 
back. After 6 days of floating on the sea, those asylum seekers were taken into Nauru 
Island and New Zealand. Since then and following the growing terrorist threat after 
9/11 attack in 2001 and Bali Bomb 2002, mobility through Timor and Arafura Sea 
turns to further securitized. The graph below illustrates the fluctuation of boats 
arrivals in Australian water both in excised and non-excised place. It is interesting to 
note that the peak of boat arrivals prevails when diplomatic tension between 
Indonesia-Australia and domestic election in Australia take place. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Number of Boats Arrivals in Australian Waters 
Source: Phillips & Sink, 2011: 19. 
 
In 2003, the death of Indonesian fishermen in Australian prison after guilty of 
illegal fishing near Ashmore reef invited strong protest from Indonesia. Table 1 
below shows that Ashmore reef become the major landing used by boats arriving at 
Australian water. This inclination corroborates the continuation of route taken by 
transborder mobility in Timor and Arafura Sea since 18th century. 
 
Table 1. Major Landing of Boat Arrival in Australia 
Major Landing 1998/1999 1999/2000 
Ashmore Islands 17 49 
Western Australia 11 15 
Queensland 3 0 
Torres Strait 4 0 
Christmas Island 3 10 
New South Wales 3 0 
Darwin 1 1 
Source: Schloenhardt 2003:148-157 
 
Later in June 2008, Indonesian television broadcasted the burning of Indonesia 
fishermen’s boat after apprehended by Australian Marine Patrol following the 
official visit of Australia Prime Minister to Jakarta. The incident actually had took 
place two years earlier. The diplomatic tension was deescalated after Indonesia 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially regretted such broadcast. Some of this conflict 
episode confirmed the transformation of transborder fishing activity in Timor and 
Arafura Sea. The expanding function of the sea had created complexity in regulating 
transborder mobility including fishing. 
 Conclusion 
Transborder fishing activity in Timor and Arafura Sea has transformed significantly 
following the intrusion of state authority to expand their sovereignty rights and 
impose further regulation on the sea. It is the practice of territorialisation of the sea 
and the application of technology that pressures the transformation of trepang and 
shell-pearls industry from small scale and traditional into massive scale and modern 
fishing industry in 19th and 20th century of colonial period. Relying on distant market 
both Chinese and British, the industry received strong support from colonial state of 
which later triggered diplomatic tension between the Dutch and the British. The 
declaration of territorial water was one of the strategies employed by the Dutch to 
settle the conflict and presented new era of sea governing on the area. The depletion 
of marine stocks threatens the industry of trepang and shell-pearl to collapse in 20th 
century, despite of nationalization of industry in Australia. For shell-pearl industry, 
it was also the invention of plastic which later close off the market demand. Soon, 
World War II that led to Japan occupation in Indonesia had temporarily destroyed 
the fishing industry in 1940s. 
 
Post-war reconstruction and decolonization in Southeast Asia in the middle of 
1940s had cemented new world order that bring second wave of transformation to 
transborder fishing in Timor and Arafura Sea. Post-colonial Indonesia, like other new 
post-colonial states in Southeast Asia, of which claiming of inheriting colonial 
administration shared strong view on sovereignty rights including territorial 
integrity on the sea. The introduction of state’s right to CS and EEZ had been 
strongly adopted by Indonesia as well Australia under the new world governance of 
United Nations. Immediately in late 1960s and early 1970s, both Indonesia and 
Australia had declared and negotiated to delimit their maritime boundary. Even in 
1982, Indonesia’s proposal of the concept of archipelagic states had been succeed to 
win international recognition. The concept of archipelagic states was originally 
drawn to deter any unauthorized mobility on the sea for security purposes. 
Inevitably, the sea governance strengthens by employing more regulation to the 
mobility on the sea. 
The sea turns to be the magnitude of state’s interest and qualify to be national 
security. Any perceived threat to state’s control on the sea is subject to security issue. 
While state-sponsored modern fishing industry are able to dominate fishing activity 
both on the access to fishing ground and the volume of catches, traditional fishing 
industry suffered from competition and push to struggle between stock depletion, 
low capital incentives and traditional fishing method. Problem of overfishing had 
increased practice of undocumented, unregistered and illegal fishing as post-colonial 
Indonesia struggle to balance its capacity between the desire of regulating fishing 
activity and the constraint of implement the regulation itself. 
The continuous fishing activity of Indonesia fishermen into Australian Fishing 
Zone is essentially be local response against the domination of state authority in 
attempt to regulating transborder fishing activities. On one hand, confronting with 
massive scale and modern fishing company, local Indonesian fishermen failed to be 
integrated and marginalized into small scale traditional fishing activities to satisfy a 
steadily Chinese market. On the other hand, growing influx of refugee and asylum 
seeker had provided lucrative but illicit opportunity to engage with new form of 
transborder activity for additional income. Interestingly, the local fishers keep 
exploiting the antiquity of transborder fishing to justify their present activities, while 
the state constantly required local loyalty to abide with present cluster of sea 
ownership. Thus, transborder fishing activity has been transformed into liquid space 
(Houben: 2012) where the network chain of activity is determined by contested 
interest of certain identities. The Timor and Arafura Seas represent a transition space 
between geographically contained space and socio-economy construction of 
subjugated local people within state’s control. 
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